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This paper analyses the reasons why Spanish banks securitised in the period 2000–2007 on such a large
scale that Spain has become the European country with the second-largest issuance volume after the UK.
The results obtained by applying a logistic regression model to a sample of 408 observations indicate
that liquidity and the search for improved performance are the decisive factors in securitisation. We find
no evidence to support hypotheses regarding credit risk transfer and regulatory capital arbitrage.
Our study also presents a more detailed analysis that differentiates between asset and liability securi-
tisation programmes.1. Introduction
Securitisation is a financial technique that allows a batch of
illiquid assets to be transformed into a liquid tradable instrument
with a known flow of income payments. This transformation is
made possible through the use of an instrumental entity (a special
purpose vehicle or SPV) that is separate, by law, from the entity
with ownership rights to the instrument. Consequently, this tech-
nique allows banks to transform heterogeneous assets that, in the
great majority of cases, are not negotiable into securities that are
liquid, homogeneous and suitable for sale to third parties. The
range of assets that can be securitised is very wide and includes
mortgage loans, credit card receivables, bonds, auto loans and
loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), among
others.
Asset securitisation has become one of the most visible conse-
quences of financial innovation in recent years. In Europe, the vol-
ume of securitised assets grew from 78.2 billion Euros in 2000 to
711.1 billion Euros in 2008, which represents a 10-fold increase
in volume in less than a decade.1 It is true that the current financial
crisis, in which securitisation seems to have played a notable role,: +34 954 348 353.
done-Riportella), rsammed@
ujillo-Ponce).
orum Data Report Q4: 2008,halted the commissioning of new securitisation programmes dur-
ing the second half of 2007 and the beginning of 2008. However,
the pressing need for liquidity among financial entities provoked
a sharp change after the first quarter of 2008, and the volume is-
sued in the latest year increased by almost 60% over that of the
previous year.
Over the past decade, Spain has established itself as one of
the most prolific European countries in issuing securitised bank-
ing assets. It is second only to the United Kingdom, despite this
financial technique’s being a relatively recent phenomenon in
Spain. In fact, although off-balance-sheet securitisation appears
to have been subject to regulation for the first time in 1992,
it was not until 1998 that the securitisation of all types of as-
sets, with or without a mortgage guarantee, was permitted.2
Appendix 1 gives an overview of the most common securitisation
structures; it also describes the situation of the Spanish market
in 2007.3
Despite this notable expansion of the market, there have been
few empirical studies focusing on the specific characteristics of2 Law 19/1992, 7 July on real estate investment companies and funds schemes and
on mortgage securitisation funds and Royal Decree 926/1998, 14 May which regulates
securitisation funds and securitisation fund management companies.
3 Data from the Report on Banking Supervision in Spain 2007, Bank of Spain.
Available at http://www.bde.es/informes/be/supervi/supervie.htm.
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banks that lead to programmes of securitisation.4 In this context,
this paper seeks to extend the scope of the existing body of
literature; it analyses the factors that encouraged Spanish banks
to securitise between 2000 and 2007. Although these specific
characteristics are currently unclear, previous studies seem to agree
on three main (but not mutually exclusive) groups of motivations as
detailed below.
First, the search for new sources of financing has been often
mentioned in the literature. The liquidity effect of securitisation
is particularly obvious in cash transactions. Here, the transfer of as-
sets follows a true (‘‘off-balance-sheet”) sale of the underlying
portfolio to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV then issues
notes to fund the assets purchased from the originating bank. Obvi-
ously, this transaction leads to an inflow of cash (funding); conse-
quently, it leads to a possible restructuring of the bank’s balance
sheet contingent on the reallocation of cash by the originator (Gor-
ton and Pennacchi, 1995). The need for liquidity has been stated to
be the principal determining factor of securitisation in recent
empirical studies such as that of Agostino and Mazzuca (2008).
Second, securitisation allows higher-risk banks to originate and
fund risky financial assets (such as mortgages, consumer loans, and
business loans) in a way that minimises financial distress costs
(Gorton and Souleles, 2006). These institutions can use SPVs to re-
move loans from their balance sheet. SPVs are structured to remain
‘‘bankruptcy-remote” from the originating firm. That is, the credi-
tors of the SPV do not have any claim against the originator’s as-
sets. Moreover, the bonds sold by the SPV are structured to make
default or bankruptcy all but impossible (although there can be de-
faults on the underlying loans). According to this efficient contract-
ing explanation, financial firms facing greater than expected
financial distress costs (such as firms with high leverage and risky
assets) are more likely to be active securitisers than other firms.
Some recent studies emphasise the importance of this factor in
the decision of a bank to securitise assets, including those of Min-
ton et al. (2004) and Bannier and Hänsel (2008). The latter authors
describe securitisation transactions as being used mainly as a risk
transfer and funding tool that increases the efficiency of both risk
sharing and liquidity transformation. However, at this point we
have to remember that the originating entity usually repurchases
the tranche of worst credit quality assets (known as the first losses
or the equity tranche) from the SPV to secure a sufficient degree of
credit improvement for subsequent tranches. This not only allows
placing the securitised bonds at a lower cost in the market, but also
limits the effective transfer of credit risk to the final investors.
Finally, another group of studies argue that banks have resorted
to asset securitisation to reduce their capital requirements (Am-
brose et al., 2005; Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Duffie and Garleanu,
2001; Pennacchi, 1988; Uzun and Webb, 2007, among others). This
would involve exploiting the opportunity to arbitrage the regula-
tory capital required under the Capital Accord of 1988 (Basel I).5
Nevertheless, the Basel II Agreement, which came into effect in the
majority of the countries of the European Union in 2008, remedies4 One portion of the existing literature offers analyses of aspects such as the effect
of securitisation on the risks incurred by the banks making use of this technique
(Dionne and Harchaoui, 2008; Hänsel and Krahnen, 2007; Vermilyea et al., 2008), the
quoted prices of the shares of the entities issuing securitisation programs (Lockwood
et al., 1996; Thomas, 1999, 2001) and the supply of bank loans (Hirtle, 2007;
Loutskina and Strahan, 2009), among others.
5 In Jones (2000), there is an analysis of the principal techniques used to perform
capital arbitrage under this Accord (Basel I). Prior to Basel II, the treatment of
securitisation from the point of view of the regulation of capital was unsatisfactory.
Regulation differed in the different jurisdictions because treatment specifically for
securitisation had not been foreseen in Basel I and, in general, the regulations were
less sensitive to risk. Because the capital required was the same, the cost of holding
low-risk assets was greater because the incremental capital was not economically
justifiable. To save on regulatory capital, banks may therefore try to remove low-risk
assets from their balance sheets and retain high-risk assets.some of the weaknesses of the Basel I Agreement. With this new Ac-
cord, the possible reduction in the capital requirements is closely
associated both with the quality of the underlying portfolio and with
the amount of risk exposure retained by the originating entity, which
prevents the possible arbitrage of capital.6 However, while some
incentives to use regulatory capital arbitrage are reduced under
the new framework of Basel II, which uses risk-sensitive capital ra-
tios, arbitrage may have contributed to the increase in securitisation
in the early years (Minton et al., 2004). Meanwhile, Bannier and Hän-
sel (2008) argue against the hypothesis that banks have been arbi-
traging their regulatory capital. They even find a significant
‘‘reverse” regulatory arbitrage effect; banks with low Tier 1 capital
securitise significantly less than banks with high Tier 1 capital.
Apart from the factors indicated, Bannier and Hänsel (2008) re-
port that another possible cause of the increase in bank securitisa-
tion is the search for improved measures of performance for the
entity. However, in the existing literature, this does not appear to
be considered a determinant variable to the same extent as the fac-
tors previously indicated. It should not be forgotten that the down-
side aspects of securitisation include the fixed costs of setting up
the SPV and a potential reduction in the flow of tax benefits from
keeping the assets on the balance sheet and financing them with
debt.7
We must also take into consideration a final series of elements
that seem to influence the decision of a bank to securitise. These
include the type (commercial bank, savings bank, credit coopera-
tive, investment bank, etc.) and size of the bank. With respect to
the originator type, Minton et al. (2004) state that ‘‘the efficient
contracting hypothesis predicts that commercial banks and savings
institutions securitise assets to a lesser degree than other institu-
tions because commercial banks and savings institutions do not
bear the costs of financial distress (the deposit insurer does). In
contrast, the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis predicts the oppo-
site”. Regarding the size, because setting up a securitisation pro-
gramme leads to significant fixed costs, we should expect only
relatively large banks to securitise their loans (Bannier and Hänsel,
2008; Uzun and Webb, 2007).
Martín-Oliver and Saurina (2007) are the only authors to date
who have analysed the factors determining bank securitisation in
Spain. To this end, they employ the financial statements provided
by banks to the Bank of Spain during the period 1999–2006. After
an analysis of the three principal motivations to which we have
previously made reference—improvement of liquidity, transfer of
credit risk and regulatory capital arbitrage—they conclude that
the only factor driving bank securitisation in Spain during that per-
iod is the need for liquidity.
Our study extends the limited previous literature on this topic
by analysing the 2000–2007 period from the Bankscope database.8
It also considers as an additional possible cause of securitisation by
banks in Spain the search for improvement in the measurement of
efficiency of the entity (in line with the work of Bannier and Hänsel
(2008) for the European market). And finally, our work includes lia-
bility securitisation programmes in the analysis for the first time.
This is a phenomenon that originated in Spain but is currently also
found in other countries. The securitisation of liabilities could be
considered an inappropriate form of securitisation, although its
structure is of the traditional type and it functions in a very similar
way to the securitisation of assets. The only notable feature is that6 For a more detailed analysis of the treatment of securitisation in Basel II, see Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) and Catarineu and Pérez (2008). Further-
more, Blum (2008), Bongaerts and Charlier (2009) and Johnston (2009) provide a
detailed discussion of the capital requirements under the Basel II Capital Framework.
7 Calmès and Théoret (2010) revisit the impact of off-balance-sheet activities on
banks risk-return trade-off.
8 The Bankscope database is compiled by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing.
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Table 1
Composition of the sample.
Bank type Year Total
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Commercial banks 16 13 15 12 14 18 16 13 117
Savings banks 37 36 31 32 31 36 33 24 260
Credit cooperatives 2 4 4 3 5 6 6 1 31
Total 55 53 50 47 50 60 55 38 408these liabilities cannot be sold to a fund; a third entity (an invest-
ment company or similar) is required to intervene, purchasing the
liabilities issued by a credit entity and selling them immediately to
the SPV.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data
and methodology employed in the empirical research and also de-
fines the explanatory variables. Section 3 presents and discusses
the results obtained. Section 4 summarises and concludes.2. Methodological aspects
2.1. Sample
Our sample comprises all of the Spanish commercial banks, sav-
ings banks and credit cooperatives in the Bankscope database dur-
ing the period 2000–2007 with information available for every one
of the variables analysed. However, those entities that presented
abnormal ratios or extreme values were eliminated from the sam-
ple as outliers. Once this filtering was complete, the final sample
consists of 408 observations, of which 117 correspond to commer-
cial banks, 260 to savings banks and 31 to credit cooperatives. Ta-
ble 1 shows the number of banks that comprise the sample for
each of the years included in the investigated time span.
To research a more homogenous sample, the analysis focuses
exclusively on those entities authorised by the Bank of Spain to
capture funds from the public. As stated in the preceding section,
these banks account for almost all issues in the Spanish securitisa-
tion market. Furthermore, the time frame considered is sufficiently
long for a longitudinal analysis, but it is not long enough for signif-
icant structural changes to have taken place. This period also coin-
cides with a substantial expansion of the securitisation activity in
Spain, encouraged by a change in the regulations that did not allow
the securitisation of all types of assets almost until the end of the
1990s. For this reason, this study focuses on the period of 2000–
2007.
Finally, we obtain the data on the securitisation activity from
the documents that the banks are compelled by law to deposit with
the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV).9
Table 2 shows that the percentage of Spanish banks that securitise
has grown considerably during this decade, increasing from 29.1%
in 2000 to more than 90% in 2007. Sorting by type of entity demon-
strates that the savings banks securitise the most; seven of every 10
have securitised during these eight years, whereas only half of the
commercial banks and credit cooperatives have made use of this
financial technique.
2.2. Definition of variables
The primary objective of this study is to determine which fac-
tors are decisive in the development of bank securitisation. Conse-
quently, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the bank has9 Information obtained from the CNMV webpage (http://www.cnmv.es). Data on
synthetic securitisation are not collected; please see Iscoe and Kreinin (2007) for
information on synthetic CDOs.acted as originator in at least one securitisation transaction and 0
otherwise. Next, we identify a series of specific characteristics of
the banks (explanatory variables). Three motivations have regu-
larly been put forward in the literature as being responsible for
the securitisation activity of banks: the search for new sources of
financing or liquidity, the transfer of credit risk and the regulatory
capital arbitrage. We add a fourth factor to this list: improvement
to the performance measures for the entity as well as a set of con-
trol variables. Therefore, whether an entity securitises or not is a
function of liquidity, credit risk, regulatory capital, performance
and the control variables. All of these explanatory variables are
in accordance with those put forward in similar studies (see Table
3).
2.2.1. Liquidity (or funding)
Following the line established in earlier studies, this study con-
siders three variables as proxies of the liquidity factor:
– (1) Interbank Ratio: This is defined as the percentage ratio of
money lent to other banks divided by money borrowed from
other banks. If this ratio is greater than 100, it indicates that
the bank is a net placer rather than a borrower of funds in the
market and therefore is more liquid.
– (2) Net Loans/Deposits & S.T. Funding: This liquidity ratio indi-
cates the relationship between loans and deposits as a percent-
age. A higher ratio corresponds to a less liquid bank.
– (3) Liquid Assets/Deposits & S.T. Funding: This is a deposit run-
off ratio that expresses the percentage of sudden customer and
short-term fund withdrawals that could be met. A higher ratio
corresponds to the entity’s being more liquid and less vulnera-
ble to a classic run on the bank.
In theory, one would expect bank to be more predisposed to
securitise part of its portfolio when the assets of the entity are less
liquid. It is precisely this lack of liquidity that would motivate
banks to seek new sources of financing in the securitisation
market.
2.2.2. Credit risk
The second group of variables is intended to measure the
risk profile of the bank. This will help to determine whether
the Spanish banks have employed securitisation as a way of
transferring part of their credit risk. If this is the case, the
banks with assets of lower quality should show greater securi-
tisation activity.
For this purpose, we choose two variables:
– (4) Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans: This ratio indicates how
much of the total loan portfolio is covered by the entity’s cur-
rent reserves. It is a reserve for losses expressed as a percentage
of total loans. Given a similar charge-off policy, a higher ratio
corresponds to a lower-quality loan portfolio.
– (5) Non-Performing Loans/Gross Loans: This is a measure of the
amount of total doubtful loans (as a percentage). Lower ratios
correspond to better asset quality.3
Table 2
Number (and percentage) of entities comprising the sample that have securitised.
Bank type Year Total
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Commercial banks 7 6 7 5 8 8 12 11 64
(43.8%) (46.2%) (46.7%) (41.7%) (57.1%) (44.4%) (75.0%) (84.6%) (54.7%)
Savings banks 8 16 20 26 27 32 30 23 182
(21.6%) (44.4%) (64.5%) (81.3%) (87.1%) (88.9%) (90.9%) (95.8%) (70.0%)
Credit cooperatives 1 1 0 2 3 4 5 1 17
(50.0%) (25.0%) (0.0%) (66.7%) (60.0%) (66.7%) (83.3%) (100.0%) (54.8%)
Total 16 23 27 33 38 44 47 35 263
(29.1%) (43.4%) (54.0%) (70.2%) (76.0%) (73.3%) (85.5%) (92.1%) (64.5%)
10 An alternative to logistic regression analysis is probit analysis. These two types of
analysis are very similar to one another. While logistic analysis is based on log odds,
probit uses the cumulative normal probability distribution. Both produce similar
results in this case. The probit analysis is available upon request.2.2.3. Regulatory capital arbitrage
If the regulatory capital arbitrage hypothesis holds true, then a
financial entity that holds less regulatory capital will have a greater
incentive to securitise its assets. The variables employed to mea-
sure the relationship between securitisation and this hypothesis
include the following:
– (6) Capital Adequacy Ratio: This ratio is the total capital ade-
quacy ratio under the Basel rules. It measures Tier 1 + Tier 2
capital, which includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan
loss reserves and valuation reserves as a percentage of risk-
weighted assets and off-balance-sheet risks. This ratio should
be at least 8%.
– (7) Equity/Total Assets: Because equity is a cushion against
asset malfunction, this ratio measures the amount of protection
afforded to the bank by the equity invested in it. A higher ratio
corresponds to the entity’s being better protected.
2.2.4. Performance
We identify a series of ratios for monitoring the effect of effi-
ciency improvement as a motivator of the bank in its propensity
to securitise:
– (8) Return On Assets (ROA): This is perhaps the single most
important ratio for comparing the efficiency and operational
performance of banks. The ratio considers the returns generated
from the assets financed by the bank.
– (9) Return On Equity (ROE): The return on equity is a measure of
the return on shareholder funds. Obviously, a higher value is
better. Still, care should be taken when weighting this ratio
too heavily in an analysis, as it may be high at the expense of
an over-leveraged balance sheet.
– (10) Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR): This ratio is currently one of
the most widely considered. It measures the overheads or cost
of running the bank (the greatest proportion of which is nor-
mally salaries) as a percentage of income generated before
provisions.
Previously published studies have not found any conclusive re-
sults based on these variables. Bannier and Hänsel (2008) find that
the need to improve the bank’s overall financial efficiency or per-
formance drives bank securitisation (i.e., lower ROA and/or ROE
values or a higher CIR ratio indicates a higher probability of the en-
tity’s deciding to securitise loans). However, based on the risk-
appetite argument, banks with relatively superior performance
should be particularly active in loan securitisation.
2.2.5. Control variables
For control purposes, we include some general characteristics of
the originating entity in the analysis as additional regressors. First,
we analyse the impact of bank size; we measure it as the log of the
entity’s total assets ((11) bank size). This variable is expected to bepositive because scaling economics follow from the fixed costs of
setting up a securitisation programme. Second, we add two dum-
my variables to identify commercial banks and savings banks
respectively ((12) bank type). This enables an evaluation of
whether the character of the entity influences the decision to secu-
ritise assets. Last, we control for year difference effects by includ-
ing a dummy variable for each year considered in the analysis
((13) year).
Table 4 summarises the explanatory variables and their ex-
pected signs as considered in the present study.2.3. Methodology
As a first approximation, we perform a univariate analysis of the
sample. This yields the principal descriptive statistics regarding the
explanatory variables and serves to indicate the main differences
between the two groups studied. We follow this preliminary study
by a multivariate analysis that explores the possible causal rela-
tionship between the probability of securitising and the explana-
tory variables to be isolated. For this analysis we choose a
logistic regression model.
Logistic regression (also known as the logistic model) is a form
of regression used when the dependent variable is dichotomous (in
this case, to securitise or not) and the independent variables are of
any type.10 It is normally employed when trying to obtain a function
to predict whether an observation belongs to a particular group or
when trying to analyse the influence of a series of independent vari-
ables on the dependent variable (in our case, those of the bank’s
characteristics that may influence its decision to securitise or not).
The logistic equation is as follows:
Zi;t ¼ b0 þ b1  Interbank Ratioi;t1 þ b2  Loans=D&STi;t1
þ b3  Liquid A=D&STi;t1 þ b4  LL Reserve=Gross Li;t1
þ b5 Non-perf : L=Gross Li;t1 þ b6  Capital Ratioi;t1
þ b7  Equity=TAi;t1 þ b8  ROAi;t1 þ b9  ROEi;t1
þ b10  CIRi;t1 þ b11  Sizei;t1 þ b12  Bank Typei;t
þ b13  Yeari;t þ ei;t : ð1Þ
Here, Zi,t is the log odds of the dependent variable for the ith
case in the tth period, b0 is a constant and the ‘‘b” terms are the lo-
gistic regression coefficients, also called parameter estimates. All
bank-specific variables enter into the regression equation stag-
gered by one period to avoid potential problems of endogeneity.
To describe the relationship between Zi and the probability of
securitising (pi) for the ith case we have to use the following link
function:4
Table 3
Bank-specific variables used in previous studies (in chronological order).
Sample Database Model
used
Bank-specifics variables
Liquidity or funding Credit risk Equity or
regulatory capital
Others characteristics
(performance, cost,
. . .)
Control variables
Calomiris and Mason
(2004)
US banks (1996) Faulkner and Gray’s Card Industry
Directory/Nilson Report
Univariate/
OLS
regression/
Probit/
Tobit
– Cash and
government
securities/on-
balance-sheet
assets
– Total loans greater
than 90 days past due
or with non-accrual
status/total assets
– Standard deviation of
total loans greater than
90 days past due or with
non-accrual status/total
assets
– Insured deposits/total
deposits
– Tiers 1 and 2
capital/managed
assets
– Tiers 1 and 2
capital/on-
balance-sheet
assets
– Growth of
Tiers 1 and 2
capital over
past year
(log difference)
No No
Minton et al. (2004) US financial
companies with
publicly traded
stock (1993–
2002)
Compustat/Securities Data
Corporation
Univariate/
Probit/
Tobit
No – Asset Risk (firm’s stock
return volatility)
– Firm’s debt rating (dummy)
– Leverage (Capital-Asset
Ratio)
No – Return on Equity
(ROE)
– Issuer’s tax
payments
– Size (market
capitalisation)
– Originator Type
(dummy)
Martín-Oliver and
Saurina (2007)
Spanish banks
(1999–2006)
Bank of Spain/Spanish National
Securities Market Commission
Probit/
Tobit
– Credit growth (high,
medium and low)
(dummy)
– Loan/deposits
– Interbank (relative
weight of interbank
liabilities)
– Non-Performing Loan Ratio
– Non-Performing Mortgage
Ratio
– Concentration of the Loan
Portfolio (Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index)
– Solvency Ratio
(quotient between
capital and risk-
weighted assets)
– Average cost of
liabilities
– Size (log of its
total assets)
– Weight of the
mortgage portfolio
– Bank type
(dummy)
– Year (dummy)
Uzun and Webb (2007) US banks
(2001–2005)
Call reports Univariate/
Logistic
Regression
No No – Total equity
capital
– Tier 1 capital
– Total risk-based
capital ratio
– Tier 1 leverage
ratio
No – Size
– Leverage
(Loan Ratio)
– Grow
Agostino and Mazzuca
(2008)
Italian banks
(1999–2006)
Bankscope/Talete Creative Finance Probit – Interbank Ratio
– Net Loans/Total
Assets
– Liquid Assets/
Dep. & ST
Funding
– Historical Cost
– Leverage (Total
Assets/Total Equity)
– Market Instruments
Funding Ratio
– Listing in Financial
Markets (dummy)
No – Tier 1 ratio
– Total capital ratio
– Return on Equity
(ROE)
– Return on Assets
(ROA)
– Net fees and
Commissions Ratio
– Interest-bearing
assets Ratio
– Size
– Number of
securitisations in
previous years
– Year (dummy)
(continued on next page)
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Table 4
Explanatory variables employed in the analysis.
Explanatory variables Expected sign
(A) Liquidity (or funding)
(1) Interbank Ratio ()
(2) Net Loans/Deposits & S.T. funding (+)
(3) Liquid Assets/Deposits & S.T. funding ()
(B) Credit Risk
(4) Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans (+)
(5) Non-Performing Loans/Gross Loans (+)
(C) Capital Regulatory
(6) Capital Adequacy Ratio ()
(7) Equity/Total Assets ()
(D) Performance
(8) Return On Assets (ROA) (±)
(9) Return On Equity (ROE) (±)
(10) Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR) (±)
(E) Others
(11) Bank Size (+)
(12) Bank Type (dummy)
(13) Year (dummy)
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3.1. Univariate analysis
Table 5 shows a first-order descriptive analysis of the sample,
which is divided into two groups: banks that securitised during
the time period considered and banks that did not (263 versus
145). The variables we select as indicators of liquidity, namely
the (1) Interbank Ratio, (2) Net Loans/Deposits & Short-Term Fund-
ing, and (3) Liquid Assets/Deposits & Short-Term Funding, evolve
in the expected direction. Banks that securitise have a lower Inter-
bank Ratio (133.05% versus 136.18%); this would indicate that the
entity resorting to securitisation is a net borrower of funds in the
interbank market and is therefore seeking to improve its financial
position. Also, the mean percentage of loans relative to deposits
and other short-term financing is 97.67% for banks that securitise,
compared with 75.96% for those that do not. Similarly, liquid assets
make up 14.87% of short-term bank financing for entities that
securitise as opposed to 23.84% for entities that do not. All of these
variables seem to indicate that, on average, the banks that engage
in securitisation present lower liquidity than those that do not.
The ratios employed to measure the bank’s credit risk, namely,
(4) Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans and (5) Non-Performing Loans/
Gross Loans, yield different results. While the former is slightly
higher for banks that securitise (2.00% versus 1.95%), the Non-Per-
forming Loans/Gross Loans ratio does not yield the expected re-
sults (0.95% for banks that securitise compared to 1.04% for those
that do not). We would expect this latter ratio to be higher for
banks that develop securitisation programmes, which would imply
that securitisation is used as a way to transfer credit risk. The sub-
sequent analyses will confirm whether this variable has statistical
significance.
The univariate analysis also shows that banks using securitisa-
tion present lower capital ratios on average than those that do not
(11.64% versus 12.82%). However, both figures are significantly
higher than the minimum 8% required by the Basel capital agree-
ments. Also, equity constitutes a smaller percentage of the total as-
sets of the entities that have chosen to securitise assets.
All three variables measuring banking efficiency or performance
(ROA, ROE and CIR) show worse mean results for the group of
banks that securitise. This may indicate that some banks have6
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for the variables.
N Range 5% percentile 95% percentile Median Mean Std. deviation
Statistic Std. error
Not securitised
(1) Interbank Ratio 145 983.89 3.74 532.05 76.26 136.18 14.64 176.27
(2) Loans/D&ST 145 160.20 3.25 114.96 81.19 75.96 2.66 32.00
(3) Liquid A./D&ST 145 94.12 1.65 63.64 21.80 23.84 1.49 17.95
(4) LL Reserve/Gross L. 145 3.89 0.45 3.50 1.89 1.95 0.06 0.78
(5) Non-Perf. L./Gross L. 145 2.73 0.24 2.24 0.89 1.04 0.05 0.58
(6) Capital Adequacy Ratio 145 28.70 8.23 21.34 12.10 12.82 0.37 4.40
(7) Equity/T.A. 145 22.58 2.44 11.83 7.45 7.68 0.29 3.54
(8) ROA 145 4.80 0.23 1.86 0.88 0.92 0.05 0.64
(9) ROE 145 29.32 4.44 20.47 12.82 12.92 0.40 4.78
(10) CIR 145 83.36 23.38 75.47 57.39 55.82 1.20 14.43
(11) Size (LN Assets) 145 11.09 13.70 18.29 15.61 15.71 0.13 1.56
Securitised
(1) Interbank Ratio 263 815.03 8.14 525.03 86.98 133.05 9.24 149.89
(2) Loans/D&ST 263 161.35 64.77 135.59 96.27 97.67 1.40 22.69
(3) Liquid A./D&ST 263 58.83 2.05 36.39 12.74 14.87 0.71 11.48
(4) LL Reserve/Gross L. 263 3.63 1.48 2.84 1.94 2.00 0.03 0.41
(5) Non-Perf. L./Gross L. 263 3.38 0.37 1.99 0.83 0.95 0.03 0.52
(6) Capital Adequacy Ratio 263 13.90 9.10 14.20 11.60 11.64 0.10 1.67
(7) Equity/T.A. 263 20.55 4.93 10.54 7.15 7.57 0.13 2.10
(8) ROA 263 3.40 0.52 1.55 0.84 0.86 0.02 0.37
(9) ROE 263 28.57 6.86 18.67 11.48 12.22 0.25 3.98
(10) CIR 263 64.59 42.22 69.92 58.69 57.94 0.51 8.26
(11) Size (LN Assets) 263 12.84 9.51 18.61 15.98 15.58 0.15 2.42decided to engage in securitisation as a way to improve their per-
formance ratios.
Finally, the mean size of the banks that securitise, measured as
the log of their total assets, is only slightly lower than that of those
banks that do not (15.58 versus 15.71). The statistical range is,
however, very high in both cases.
Next, we perform an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine
whether the differences found in the mean values of the variables
studied are statistically significant.11 At the univariate level, four of
the considered variables show significantly different behaviour for
those banks that securitise versus those that do not (see Table 6).
These four variables are as follows:
– (2) Net Loans/Deposits & Short-Term Funding.
– (3) Liquid Assets/Deposits & Short-Term Funding.
– (6) Capital Adequacy Ratio.
– (10) Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR).12 The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measures the impact of collinearity among the
variables in a regression model. The VIF shows us the degree to which the variance of
the coefficient estimate is inflated by multicollinearity. The square root of the VIF tells
us how much larger the standard error is compared with what it would be if that
variable were uncorrelated with the other X variables in the equation. A common rule
of thumb is that VIFs of 10 or higher (or equivalently, those with a tolerance of 0.10 or
less) can be regarded as indicating multicollinearity. In weaker models, even values
above 2.5 may be a cause for concern.
13 This absence of multicollinearity was corroborated by analysing the Index of
Condition.
14 To test the significance of individual logistic regression coefficients for each
independent variable (that is, to test the null hypothesis in logistic regression that a
particular logit (effect) coefficient is zero), we use the Wald statistic. We also findIn summary, at the univariate level, significant differences seem
to exist in terms of mean levels of liquidity (variables (2) and (3)),
regulatory capital (variable (6)), and banking efficiency (variable
(10)) between the banks that securitise and those that do not. On
average, those banks that securitise present lower liquidity, lower
capital ratios, and lower performance.
3.2. Multivariate analysis
After univariate analysis, we conduct a logistic regression anal-
ysis. First, however, we perform an analysis of multicollinearity for
the independent variables previously selected. A study of the ma-
trix of correlations indicates that the coefficients of bivariate corre-
lation are all close to zero, except for those between ratio (8) ROA
and the variables (7) Equity/Total Assets and (9) ROE. We subse-
quently confirmthis dependencevia ananalysis ofmulticollinearity.11 The basis of ANOVA is the partitioning of sums of squares into between-group
and within-group portions. These calculations are used via the Fisher statistic (F) to
analyse the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis states that there is no difference
between means of the different groups, suggesting that the variance of the within-
group samples should be identical to that of the between-group samples (resulting in
no between-group discrimination capability).The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all of these variables is close
to 10, and in the case of the ROA ratio, it reaches a value of
14.462.12 As a result, we eliminate this ratio from the analysis, lead-
ing to substantial improvement in all the VIFs of the independent
variables, whose values are now all below 2 (in the majority of cases,
they are close to 1).13
Once the multicollinearity issue has been dealt with, we can
then determine the logistic model. Table 7 reflects the results
achieved by applying the logistic regression to the sample of banks
(model 1). Of the set of variables considered in the study, five (two
ratios of bank liquidity and ratios of performance, size, and bank
type) present statistical significance14:
– (1) Interbank Ratio.
– (2) Net Loans/Deposits & Short-Term Funding.
– (10) Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR).
– (11) Size.
– (12) Bank Type.
The signs of the coefficients confirm our expectations.15 There-
fore, one expects a greater likelihood of securitisation by a bank
when either the Interbank Ratio is lower or the proportion of thestatistical significance for the years included in the analysis as dummy variables.
15 Parameter estimates (b coefficients) associated with explanatory variables are
estimators of the change in the logit causedby a unit change in the independent variable.
The b coefficients vary between plus andminus infinity, with 0 indicating that the given
explanatory variable does not affect the logit (that is, it does not affect the probability of
securitising). Positive or negative b coefficients indicate that the explanatory variable
increases or decreases the logit of the dependent variable, respectively.
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Table 6
Analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Variables Sum of squares df Mean squares F Sig.
(1) Interbank Ratio
Between groups 913.839 1 913.839 0.036 0.850
Within groups 1.036E+07 406 25517.957
Total 1.036E+07 407
(2) Loans/D&ST
Between groups 44034.845 1 44034.845 63.322 0.000***
Within groups 282335.483 406 695.408
Total 326370.328 407
(3) Liquid A./D&ST
Between groups 7513.045 1 7513.045 37.668 0.000***
Within groups 80978.505 406 199.454
Total 88491.550 407
(4) LL Reserve/Gross L.
Between groups 0.288 1 0.288 0.884 0.348
Within groups 132.498 406 0.326
Total 132.786 407
(5) Non-Perf. L./Gross L.
Between groups 0.766 1 0.766 2.615 0.107
Within groups 118.872 406 0.293
Total 119.638 407
(6) Capital Adequacy Ratio
Between groups 130.839 1 130.839 15.102 0.000***
Within groups 3517.553 406 8.664
Total 3648.393 407
(7) Equity/T.A.
Between groups 1.072 1 1.072 0.147 0.702
Within groups 2961.978 406 7.296
Total 2963.050 407entity’s loans that are financed with deposits and other short-term
debt (less liquidity) is higher. Still, a high Cost-to-Income Ratio could
motivate the bank to securitise part of its portfolio of assets with the
aim of improving its profitability.
Since we use logistic regression, it will be the marginal effects
that give us a more reliable idea of how much the probability of
securitising increases given a specific variation in the explanatory
variables.16 Therefore, because the marginal effect (in percentage
terms) of the (10) CIR variable is equal to 2.265, we can state that
when this ratio increases by one unit, the probability that a bank will
opt to securitise will increase by 2.265% when other variables are
controlled for. This leads to a new conclusion; of the three ratios
with statistical significance, it is the CIR ratio that appears to exert
the most influence on the probability that a bank will securitise.
Moreover, the likelihood of securitisation is increased by 19% if
the bank in question is a savings bank. This is an expected result,
given that 70% of the Spanish savings banks securitised in the per-
iod studied, compared with only 50% of commercial banks and
credit cooperatives. Also, the logistic model seems to indicate that
large banks are more disposed to securitise than smaller ones.
Using securitisation as a mechanism for transferring credit risk
is not a relevant factor over the period considered. This could be be-
cause the Spanish banks have retained an increasingly large share
of the risks associated with securitisation (the ‘‘originate-to-hold”
as opposed to the ‘‘originate-to-distribute”model of securitisation).
Finally, the regulatory capital arbitrage hypothesis is not con-
firmed by the logistic model. None of the variables used to test this
hypothesis (ratios (6) Capital Adequacy Ratio and (7) Equity/Total
Assets) reach statistical significance in the regression analysis.(8) ROA
Between groups 0.398 1 0.398 1.690 0.194
Within groups 95.478 406 0.235
Total 95.876 407
(9) ROE
Between groups 45.667 1 45.667 2.493 0.115
Within groups 7438.296 406 18.321
Total 7483.963 407
(10) CIR
Between groups 421.492 1 421.492 3.576 0.059*
Within groups 47850.961 406 117.860
Total 48272.453 407
(11) SIZE (LN Assets)
Between groups 1.586 1 1.586 0.343 0.559
Within groups 1879.959 406 4.630
Total 1881.545 407
* Statistical significance level at the 10%.
*** Statistical significance level at the 1%.3.3. Results according to the characteristics of the underlying portfolio
As can be seen in Appendix 1, most of the securitisation pro-
grammes in Spain have mortgage loans as their underlying assets.
In these programmes, the securitisation of other assets, such as
commercial loans or consumer credits, accounts for a much smaller
fraction. In any case, the securitised portfolios consist of large
numbers of assets of relatively low individual value with similar
risk profiles (ABS-transactions). However, a significant percentage
of securitisation in Spain (approximately 20%) is backed by liabili-
ties issued by banks, mainly mortgage-covered bonds (the so-
called cédulas hipotecarias).17 In a high percentage of cases, these
programmes are structured as CDOs. By definition, the securitisation
of liabilities cannot be used to transfer the rights and risks associated
with the assets. Consequently, one would expect the transfer of cred-
it risk not to be a motivating factor in this type of transaction; in con-
trast, it could be expected to motivate ABS transactions.
To check the validity of this starting hypothesis, we break down
the original sample into two non-exclusive subgroups to identify
differences in the behaviour of the banks depending on the type
of underlying being securitised (assets versus liabilities). We pres-
ent the results from this logistic regression model for the two types
of securitisation indicated in Table 8 (models 2 and 3).
In this analysis, factors driving banks to securitise assets con-
tinue to be the objective of greater liquidity (ratio (2) Loans/Deposits
& Short-Term Debt) and improved performance (ratio (10) CIR) as
we confirm. However, the principal—and sole—motivation appears16 The marginal effect is simply the gradient of the logistic cumulative distribution
function at this mean value. For a continuous variable, it can be represented as follows:
@Probðyi ¼ 1Þ
@xk
¼ @F
@xk
¼ 1
1þ expðx0ibÞ
 1
1þ expðx0ibÞ
 bk:
For a dummy variable (Di), it makes no sense to compute a derivative. In this case,
the marginal effect is equal to Prob½yi ¼ 1jxi;Di ¼ 1  Prob½yi ¼ 1jxi;Di ¼ 0.
17 The cédulas hipotecarias are covered bonds issued by Spanish banks and backed by
mortgage loans.to be the search for improved liquidity in the case of the securitisa-
tion of liabilities (ratios (1) Interbank Ratio and (2) Loans/Deposits &
Short-Term Debt). In reality, the securitisation of liabilities consti-
tutes an alternative way of placing these liabilities on the market.
The reason is that securitisation, by means of the subordination of
the securities issued (the tranche structure), can obtain the maxi-
mum credit rating (AAA) for almost the entire issue. In many cases,
it even improves the credit rating of the originating credit entity.
The transfer of credit risk remains an irrelevant factor in
explaining the securitisation by Spanish banks. None of the vari-
ables used to measure the bank’s credit risk shows statistical sig-
nificance for both types of programmes. While we might expect
this in the securitisation of liabilities by means of CDO-type struc-
tures, we might not necessarily expect this in the case of the secu-
ritisation of assets (ABS transactions). This, again, suggests that
Spanish banks have opted for an ‘‘originate-to-hold” model of sec-
uritisation as opposed to the ‘‘originate-to-distribute” model.
Besides, neither model confirms the regulatory capital arbitrage
hypothesis, which seems to definitively discount the notion that8
Table 7
Determinants of bank securitisation.
Variables b Std.
error
Marginal effect
(100)
Model 1
(1) Interbank Ratio 0.002** 0.001 0.046
(2) Loans/D&ST 0.049*** 0.011 0.983
(3) Liquid A./D&ST 0.014 0.015 0.289
(4) LL Reserve/Gross L. 0.264 0.354 5.323
(5) Non-Perf. L./Gross L. 0.520 0.374 10.499
(6) Capital Adequacy Ratio 0.002 0.055 0.045
(7) Equity/T.A. 0.052 0.052 1.056
(9) ROE 0.113 0.050 2.280
(10) CIR 0.112*** 0.021 2.265
(11) Size (LN Assets) 0.329*** 0.144 6.644
(12a) Commercial bank 0.057 0.973 1.154
(12b) Savings bANK 0.905* 0.853 19.030
Constant 12.671*** 2.579 –
Year dummy Yes
N securitised (N not
securitised)
263 (145)
Log pseudo-likelihood 178.526
Wald statistic 145.34***
Pseudo-R2 0.477
Notes: The dependent variable equals 1 if a bank completes a securitisation trans-
action and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by banks. For the dummy
variables, the marginal effects are for a discrete change from 0 to 1.
* Statistical significance level at the 10%.
** Statistical significance level at the 5%.
*** Statistical significance level at the 1%.
Table 8
Determinants of bank securitisation according to the characteristics of the underlying por
Variables Model 2 (ABS)
b Marginal
(1) Interbank Ratio 0.001 0.027
(0.001)
(2) Loans/D&ST 0.037*** 0.927
(0.009)
(3) Liquid A./D&ST 0.003 0.081
(0.015)
(4) LL Reserve/Gross L. 0.211 5.223
(0.386)
(5) Non-Perf. L./Gross L. 0.462 11.474
(0.367)
(6) Capital Adequacy Ratio 0.015 0.361
(0.052)
(7) Equity/T.A. 0.073 1.824
(0.056)
(9) ROE 0.062 1.543
(0.047)
(10) CIR 0.076*** 1.881
(0.021)
(11) Size (LN Assets) 0.458*** 11.373
(0.131)
(12a) Commercial bank 0.449 11.002
(0.794)
(12b) Savings bank 1.157* 28.146
(0.699)
Constant 9.163***
(2.497)
Year dummy Yes
N securitised (N not securitised) 185 (223)
Log pseudo-likelihood 216.841
Wald statistic 99.06***
Pseudo-R2 0.361
Notes: In Model 2 the dependent variable equals 1 if a bank completes an ABS-transaction
Liabilities CDO transaction (most likely a CDO of cédulas hipotecarias) and 0 otherwise. S
dummy variables, the marginal effects are for discrete change from 0 to 1.
* Statistical significance level at the 10%.
*** Statistical significance level at the 1%.Spanish banks may have employed securitisation as a way of
reducing regulatory capital.
Finally, we show the type of bank to be relevant when a securi-
tisation programme is established. The likelihood of issuing an ABS
is reduced by 28% if the bank considered is a savings bank. By con-
trast, in the case of a liability securitisation programme, the likeli-
hood of it being developed increases by 72% when the bank in
question is a savings bank. In other words, savings banks have a
greater propensity than commercial banks to opt for the securitisa-
tion of liabilities. We also observe that when we distinguish be-
tween types of securitisation programmes (ABS versus Liabilities
CDO), there is a change in the effect of entity size on the probability
of securitising. Thus, it is the smaller savings banks that are more
inclined to implement liability securitisation programmes,
whereas, in the case of ABS programmes, it is the larger banks that
are more predisposed to securitise.
3.4. Robustness checks
In order to further confirm the aforementioned findings, we
conduct a number of robustness checks and report all of these re-
sults in Table 9. First, with respect to the variables employed as
regressors, we re-estimate the previous models (models 2 and 3)
in order to retest those hypotheses with no statistical significance.
To this end, we replace the Non-Performing Loans/Gross Loans ra-
tio with the Loan Loss Provisions/Net Interest Income ratio as a
proxy for the measurement of the credit risk of the banks (modelstfolio.
Model 3 (Liabilities CDO)
effect (100) b Marginal effect (100)
0.003*** 0.061
(0.001)
0.036*** 0.757
(0.012)
0.015 0.311
(0.017)
0.178 3.753
(0.442)
0.128 2.696
(0.447)
0.053 1.128
(0.070)
0.033 0.702
(0.087)
0.131 2.765
(0.041)
0.040 0.843
(0.021)
0.544*** 11.484
(0.195)
1.321 29.805
(1.230)
5.118*** 72.451
(1.173)
6.358*
(3.595)
Yes
150 (258)
143.047
112.67***
0.628
and 0 otherwise. In Model 3 the dependent variable equals 1 if a bank completes a
tandard errors, which are reported in parentheses, are clustered by banks. For the
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Table 9
Robustness checks.
Variables ABS Liabilities CDO
Model 4 Model 6 Model 8 Model 10 Model 12 Model 5 Model 7 Model 9 Model 11 Model 13
(1) Interbank Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000** 0.002*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
(2) Loans/D&ST 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.006*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.005*** 0.024*** 0.042***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.006) (0.013)
(3) Liquid A./D&ST 0.003 0.013 0.000 0.007 0.012 0.013 0.003 – 0.014
(0.015) (0.016) (0.003) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.002) (0.025)
(4) LL Reserve/Gross L. 0.300 0.089 0.050 0.058 0.332 0.196 0.001 – 0.167
(0.264) (0.297) (0.056) (0.412) (0.361) (0.419) (0.046) (0.498)
(5) Non-Perf. L./Gross L. 0.512 0.085 0.378 – 0.109 0.011 – 0.188
(0.295) (0.058) (0.397) (0.406) (0.048) (0.484)
(5) Loan L. Prov./Net Int. Inc. 0.062 – 0.060 – – – –
(0.022) (0.029)
(6) Capital Adequacy Ratio 0.037 0.003 0.005 0.073 – 0.000 – 0.036
(0.055) (0.011) (0.079) (0.089) (0.009) (0.104)
(6) Tier 1 0.107 – – 0.019 – – –
(0.065) (0.081)
(7) Equity/T.A. 0.056 0.007 0.016 0.091** 0.097 0.034 0.024 0.004 – 0.045
(0.060) (0.067) (0.011) (0.045) (0.091) (0.080) (0.091) (0.009) (0.098)
(9) ROE 0.087 0.057 0.007 0.062 0.125 0.133 0.007 – 0.135
(0.044) (0.043) (0.008) (0.057) (0.051) (0.050) (0.006) (0.060)
(10) CIR 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.013*** 0.049*** 0.075*** 0.045 0.040 0.007 – 0.047
(0.017) (0.017) (0.003) (0.012) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.003) (0.027)
(11) Size (LN Assets) 0.412*** 0.395*** 0.090*** 0.666*** 0.467** 0.543*** 0.054*** – 0.523**
(0.111) (0.115) (0.022) (0.194) (0.161) (0.167) (0.018) (0.208)
(12a) Commercial bank 0.575 0.582 0.084 0.967*** 0.844 1.367 1.346 0.179 – 1.329
(0.543) (0.547) (0.111) (0.269) (0.952) (1.178) (1.183) (0.093) (1.321)
(12b) Savings bank 1.229*** 1.247*** 0.244** 1.566* 5.211*** 5.086*** 0.614*** 3.569*** 5.574***
(0.465) (0.463) (0.096) (0.827) (1.113) (1.130) (0.080) (0.399) (1.263)
Constant 8.914*** 7.118*** 1.212*** 6.100*** 9.544*** 6.776** 6.830** 0.468 4.391*** 8.246**
(2.262) (2.343) (0.407) (1.114) (3.390) (3.248) (3.360) (0.338) (0.773) (4.200)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N securitised (N not securitised) 185 (223) 185 (223) 185 (223) 185 (223) 185 (223) 150 (258) 150 (258) 150 (258) 150 (258) 150 (258)
Log (pseudo) likelihood 205.730 210.529 221.023 245.132 202.920 163.732 151.031 155.001 180.002 140.154
Wald statistic 89.90*** 91.50*** 90.01*** 76.63*** 52.83*** 109.75*** 113.59*** 111.10*** 106.11*** 64.69***
Pseudo-R2 0.374 0.368 0.323 0.215 0.636 0.627 0.601 0.574
Notes: In Models 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 the dependent variable equals 1 if a bank completes an ABS-transaction and 0 otherwise. In Models 5, 7, 9, 11 and 13 the dependent variable equals 1 if a bank completes a Liabilities CDO
transaction (most likely a CDO of cédulas hipotecarias) and 0 otherwise. Models 4 and 5 include the Loan Loss Provisions/Net Interest Income ratio in place of the Non-Performing Loans/Gross Loans ratio. The rest of the variables
remain the same. Models 6 and 7 consider the Tier 1 Ratio in place of the Capital Ratio. The rest of the variables remain the same. Models 8 and 9 are estimated via robust regression. Models 10 and 11 employ a forward conditional
stepwise method for the selection of variables. Models 12 and 13 are estimated using a random effects logistic regression model. Standard errors, which are clustered by banks, are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical significance level at the 10%.
** Statistical significance level at the 5%.
*** Statistical significance level at the 1%.
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4 and 5). This latter ratio was employed previously by authors such
as Bannier and Hänsel (2008), and it measures the relationship be-
tween the provisions in the profit and loss account and the interest
income over the same period. Ideally, this ratio should be as low as
possible, and in the case of a well-run bank, if the lending book
presents higher risk, this should be reflected by higher interest
margins. In the same way, we employ the Tier 1 ratio in place of
the capital ratio as a proxy variable to analyse the possible use of
securitisation as a mechanism for arbitraging regulatory capital
(models 6 and 7). It has frequently been employed in previously
published studies to measure the relationship between securitisa-
tion and the regulatory capital arbitrage hypothesis (for example,
in studies by Agostino and Mazzuca, 2008; Bannier and Hänsel,
2008; Calomiris and Mason, 2004). This ratio is shareholder funds
plus perpetual non-cumulative preference shares as a percentage
of risk-weighted assets and off-balance-sheet risks measured un-
der the Basel rules, and it should be at least 4%. In both cases,
the results do not differ from those obtained previously, which
again confirms the irrelevance of the hypotheses that the transfer
of credit risk and the regulatory capital arbitrage are driving factors
in the securitisation activity of Spanish banks.
Second, we use robust regression (models 8 and 9). This is an
important tool for analysing data that could be disproportionately
affected by outliers. The main purpose of robust regression is to
provide reliable and stable results when outliers are present by
limiting their influence. This robust regression algorithm uses iter-
atively reweighted least squares to estimate both the regression
coefficients and the standard errors, assigning lower weights to
those observations with high leverage or influence. As we confirm
(see Table 9), most of the explanatory variables maintain either
their sign or their statistical significance. Nevertheless, we do see
a certain loss of statistical significance in the case of the liability
securitisation programmes for ratio (1), the Interbank Ratio, where
significance drops from the 1% to the 5% level.18
Third, we modify the method used to select variables utilising a
forward conditional stepwise method (models 10 and 11). The for-
ward stepwise logistic regressionmethod automatically determines
which variables to add from the model. It begins with the constant-
onlymodel and adds variables one at a time until it reaches the step
at which all variables not in themodel have a significance level that,
in this case, is higher than 0.05. The most striking difference be-
tween this model and previous ones emerges in the variables that
determine the ABS-type securitisation, where the (7) Equity/Total
Assets ratio demonstrates statistical significance, although with a
different sign than would be expected (see model 10). On this basis,
the most solvent banks should be more inclined to securitise their
assets. Bannier and Hänsel (2008) also observe this ‘‘reverse” regu-
latory arbitrage effect exists in the European market.
Finally, we perform a fourth robustness check to evaluate the
method of estimation used in the analysis. Since panel data are
used, we can re-estimate the model with fixed or random effects.
The random effects estimator is more attractive when the ‘‘unob-
served heterogeneity” is uncorrelated with all of the explanatory
variables. If we have good controls in our equation, we might be-
lieve that any leftover neglected heterogeneity only induces serial
correlation in the composite error term and does not cause corre-
lation between the composite errors and the explanatory variables.
Also, random effects models allow for explanatory variables that
are constant over time; this is one advantage they have over fixed
effects models. Again, the results we attain using the random ef-18 Moreover, given that the liquidity measures seem to have larger outliers (based
on the descriptive statistics in Table 5), we replicate the estimations by dropping the
observations lying in the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the distribution of each
variable. This brings about a reduction in the number of observations from the
sample, but the results confirm the pattern’s having emerged so far.fects logistic regression models (models 12 and 13) do not differ
from those obtained previously using the base models.19 They coin-
cide both in terms of the explanatory variables and in their sign,
although we do note some loss of statistical significance.4. Conclusions
Securitisation is a financial operation by which a bank trans-
forms a non-negotiable asset or right to payment/income flow into
a fixed-income instrument that is homogeneous, standardised and,
consequently, tradable on organised securities markets. Recently,
securitisation programmes in Europe have grown exponentially
in volume, expanding from 78.2 billion Euros in 2000 to 711.1 bil-
lion Euros in 2008. Spain is the second-largest securitisation mar-
ket in Europe in terms of volume issued.
In this paper, we investigate what drives bank securitisation in
Spain. In addition, we explore differences between the banks that
securitise assets and those that securitise liabilities, which is an as-
pect that has scarcely been touched upon in the previous literature.
Our study confirm the hypotheses that liquidity and the search for
improvements in efficiency are the driving factor that have led
Spanish banks to securitise in the period 2000–2007. The logistic
regression model does not confirm the hypotheses regarding the
transfer of credit risk and regulatory capital arbitrage.
Amoredetailedanalysis, differentiatingbetweenasset and liabil-
ity securitisation programmes, reveals that the objective of seeking
newsources of financing is a key factor in both types of programmes.
In fact, Spanish banks have employed the securitisation of liabilities
in the period analysed for funding purposes only; none of the other
variables analysedhasplayedany role in this case. The securitisation
of liabilities bymeans of CDO-type structures is generally utilised by
medium-sized savings banks that are able to indirectly group their
credits into a common fund. In this way, they can reach the mini-
mum volume necessary to participate in these markets.
The use of securitisation, both as a mechanism in the search for
liquidity and, therefore, as a source of additional financing, has in-
creased since the beginning of the current financial crisis in August
2007. However, its use has changed since that time; an increasing
number of banks have underwritten their own securitisation pro-
grammes to use them as a guarantee for obtaining resources in
the auctions of the European Central Bank (ECB). Similarly, some
banks are using securitised bonds to obtain liquidity through the
Financial Assets Acquisition Fund (FAAF), which was created in
2008 by the Spanish government to generate the liquidity neces-
sary to allow banks to continue lending to the private residential
property sector. Both practices have partially replaced the issue
of debt, or the interbank market itself, as sources of finance to en-
able banks to grant loans.
The transfer of credit risk is not a relevant factor in the ABS
programmes for the period of time considered. Unlike in other
financial systems, particularly in the United States, Spanish banks
have retained an increasingly large share of the risks associated
with securitisation (the ‘‘originate-to-hold” model of securitisation
as opposed to the ‘‘originate-to-distribute” model). Therefore, since
the Circular 4/2004 of the Bank of Spain came into effect in 2005,
the volume of operations in which the assets have been taken off
the balance sheet has been relatively small.2019 The Hausman Tests both have insignificant p-values—that is, Prob > chi2 larger
than 0.05; in such a case, it is safe to use random effects. This technique tests the null
hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator
are the same as those estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator.
20 This regulation tightened the criteria for permitting securitised assets to be
eliminated from the balance sheets of banks. To do this, there should be a substantial
transfer of all the risks and profits associated with the securitised assets.
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Related to the regulatory capital arbitrage hypothesis, this pa-
per finds that this variable has not been a key factor in the past.
Although the normative development of Basel II in Spain, culminat-
ing with Circular 3/2008 of the Bank of Spain (which came into ef-
fect in June 2008), imposes many more restrictions on banks
attempting to reduce their capital requirements using securitisa-
tion programmes, it does not seem likely that this will affect the fu-
ture development of the market.
Finally, the results of this study suggest that the performance-
improvement variables cannot be ignored as motivating factors
of asset securitisation. The Spanish banks have sought to use asset
securitisation to improve their efficiency ratios.
Our findings generally coincide with those reported by previous
studies. Bannier and Hänsel (2008) find that a European bank with
greater credit risk exposure, lower liquidity and worse perfor-
mance measures is more likely to securitise. However, according
to Agostino and Mazzuca (2008) and Martin-Oliver and Saurina
(2007), the only determining factor in securitisation is the search
for new sources of bank financing in the Italian and Spanish mar-
kets, respectively.Acknowledgements
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applies.Appendix 1. Types of securitisation and the Spanish marketAccording to the
term of the
securities
issued:According to the
characteristics of
the underlying
portfolio:Based on the
underlying asset:Long term Asset-Backed
Securities (ABS)
(backedby portfolios of
homogeneous assets
comprisingexposure to
a large number of
obligors)– Residential
Mortgage-Backed
Securities (RMBS)
– Commercial
Mortgage-Backed
Securities (CMBS)
– Other ABS (auto,
credit cards, leases,
SMEs, etc.)Collateralised Debt
Obligations
(CDOs)
(backed by
heterogeneous
exposure
to a limited number of
names)– Collateralised Loan
Obligations
(CLOs)
– Collateralised
Bond Obligations
(CBOs)
– Structured Finance
CDOs (such as
CDOs of ABS)According to the aim of
the transaction:
– Balance-Sheet
CDOs
– Arbitrage CDOs
Short term Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP)The Spanish Market in 2007
– The total volume securitised by Spanish banks in 2007
reached 136.8 billion Euros (46% more than the previous
year) in contrast to barely 8 billion Euros securitised in
the first years of the decade.
– The securitisation of bank assets accounted for around 80%
of the securitisation activity in Spain. The largest issuing
sector was RMBS transactions, which accounted for 46% of
total issuance in 2007; the securitisation of commercial
loans (14.0%) and the securitisation of credit to SMEs
(7.5%) ranked second and third, respectively. As an emerg-
ing trend, 13 billion Euros of interbank loans were securi-
tised in 2007. The other types of underlying assets,
together with the programmes of short-term debt securiti-
sation (ABCP), comprised only a small minority of the total
assets.
– On the other hand, the securitisation of liabilities in 2007
was backed exclusively by mortgage-covered bonds (cédu-
las hipotecarias). These represented close to 20% of the total
securitised volume, although they grew at a slower rate
than in the preceding years. Such securitisation pro-
grammes are usually classified in the international market
as CDOs.
– The great majority of securitisations are of the traditional
type; the synthetic type of securitisation, in which the
credit risk of the portfolio being securitised is transferred
by the contracting of credit derivatives, only represents a
small minority in Spain.
– Finally, commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooper-
atives, accounting for 99%, continue to be almost the only
securitisation actors in Spain.References
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